The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 59 | Number 1

February 1992

Instruction for HeaIthcare Administrators
John J. Myers

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Myers, John J. (1992) "Instruction for HeaIthcare Administrators," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 59: No. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol59/iss1/6

Article 6

Instruction for HeaIthcare Administrators
by Most Reverend John J. Myers, J.e.D., Bishop of Peoria
Questions concerning the end of human life provoke uncertainty today
in the healthcare field and contradiction in the legal field. I With increasing
urgency such questions call for our attention, both because of their
frequency and because of the rapidly changing legal environment. Soon
The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990 2 will take effect. This Act
requires, among other things , that all healthcare facilities participating in
the Medicare or Medicaid programs declare in writing their policies for the
implementation of any advance directives , such as living wills or durable
powers of attorney for healthcare, which their patients may present to
them.
An advance directive is a legal instrument which becomes operative
within existing personal relationships. Personal interdependency unites
the physici;ins and the entire team of health professionals with the patient
and the patient's family and friends as well as with the healthcare facility
and the Catholic Church in whose healing mission Catholic facilities share.
Each in its own way contributes to the good of the patient.
The Catholic healthcare facilit y is not a passive and indifferent site for
the patient-physician relationship. Driven by its mission, the facility takes
an active role in the delivery of healthcare. The Catholic facility's mission is
a participation in the healing mission of the Church, an extension of the
healing mission of Christ.
Informed by Christ's own view of human life, the Catholic facility joins
the physician's medical expertise to its own human expertise with a view to
the relief of suffering. Ideally, the patient and the physician operate within
the vision of human life proposed by the facility . Still, it may happen that a
patient or physician seeks a course of treatment which is at odds with the
teaching incorporated in the policies ofthe Catholic facility. This situation
has already been addressed with respect to abortion and sterilization. The
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities) have
clearly articulated the Catholic position on these questions. Euthanasia
frequently opposed by Church teaching,4 is directly condemned in the
Directives.5 Still, there is need to address explicitly the situations which
may be created by advance directives, since there may be some doubt
concerning which principles apply.
As Catholic healthcare facilities seek to formulate their policies in this
regard, I wish to offer guidance by reflecting upon the Catholic moral
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tradition and the role of the Catholic healthcare facility in the physicianpatient relationship.
I. The Contemporary Situation

Surely all dedicated to healthcare wish to provided the benefits modern
medicine makes available to those whose health is weakened and who
require the assistance of medical technology. It is precisely this will to do
good for others that creates the hesitancy many experience when they
apply ·even minimal life-sustaining technology to those unfortunate
persons who yet live bodily, while their higher human faculties appear to
have slipped away.
The questions which confront one facing this situation cut to the deepest
presuppositions about the meaning of human life: What limit is there to
what-must be done to preserve my life? May I refuse to preserve my life in
what I consider to be an inhuman and undignified state? Has technology
failed to preserve our humanity even as it preserves our lives? Such
questions touch upon many complex issues: the gift oflife, the inevitability
of death , the fact of suffering, the power of technology. Our response to
these questions must be founded upon the same Christian understanding
of human life which makes the care of the sick and the suffering a concern
of the Church.
As theoretical, these questions are vexing enough; facing an actual
situation where one must determine the future of another person, who may
be severely debilitated, raises these questions with their full gravity. They
provoke not only doubt, but also fears and expectations of protracted
suffering. Death seems to be the only release from an apparent slavery to
technology, which preserves life but cannot restore health . I have great
personal concern for those actually facing these problems, as well as for
those who fear to face them. This moves me to offer guidance founded
upon both a belief in the sanctity of human life and the recognition that
death is inevitable and need not be opposed through measures which
impose terms of life to be feared more than death itself.
For many people, a general climate of anxiety accompanies any contact
with the medical profession. It represents both a science, that they may not
understand, and an art, that may seem to treat the body, which is not
extrinsic to the person ,6 as a thing. Some find medical procedures
humiliating, and therefore fear the cure as well as the illness. We naturally
shrink from imagining ourselves suffering any debility, but there is also
growing anxiety at the prospect of chronic dependence upon the medical
profession. People especially fear a technologically achieved preservation
of their lives in a debilitated state.
The questions we face today are not independent of this climate of
anxiety. These fears are not to be discounted lightly. Still, we have no
reason to feel helpless in the face of such fears, as though we were governed
by them rather than the truth of Christ. Christ offers hope. For while death
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is certain, in Him it is not final; while suffering is universal, in Him it is not
empty. The meaning of suffering and death in our life and the lives of those
we serve depends upon their meaning in the life of Christ Himself.? Christ
is the Victor over every kind of evil and we symbolize His triumph by the
Cross upon which He suffered. Death is not the solution to human
suffering. Rather, Christ is the solution to both suffering and death. Christ
Himself reveals the truth of human life,s intended for all men and women
of all traditions .9 This truth, though not simple and sometimes not fully
clear, is our guide through difficult times and difficult questions; we return
to it continually in order to bring light to our darkness .
II. The Catholic Heritage

At the heart of the Revelation of Christ is the truth that all human life is
created out of love and in the image and likeness of God. From the first
through the last moment of earthly existence and beyond , the human
person never loses this fundamental dignity nor the cradle of divine love in
which it is created. Human life, which comes from God , belongs to Him
still, so that we are not our own: we are to glorify God in our bodies lO and
serve the Creator before any creature. Ii
Human life and health, therefore, are to be preserved in the service of
God. In this context, our common theological tradition has spoken of a
duty to preserve life and health. This duty has never been understood to be
an absolute duty, as if bodily life were the highest good. Rather, in full
recognition of the need for earthly life to be completed and perfected in a
higher life (which is also a bodily life), the fulfillment of this duty to
preserve life and health has been recognized to ha ve limits. Life and health
are never to be neglected or attacked, but they need not be defended by any
and all means.
For centuries, the question of the means which preserve life and health
was relatively simple, for the unsophisticated state of medicine created few
dilemmas. As medicine increased in complexity and proficiency,
theological reflection upon the meaning of bodily life and the duty to
preserve it advanced also. Our developing tradition of theological
reflection has articulated several principles which help us to understand
the role medical science is to play in our lives.
III. The Theological Tradition

The elements of the theological tradition appear in two forms . The
writings of the theologians present reflections upon Revelation. These
writings enjoy the authority that they secure for themselves through the
strength of their own arguments. Second, the statements of the
Magisterium present normative interpretations of Revelation.These
statements enjoy varying degrees of authority, evidenced in their form of
expression, but they must always be regarded as authoritatively giving
direction to and frequently setting necessary limits to any further discusison,
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In matters of healthcare, both forms of the tradition have appeared.
Scholastic theologians developed a consistent doctrine for addressing
questions related to life and health . Additionally, the Magisterium has
endorsed some elements of this common theological tradition. Relative to
patient self-determination with respect to advance directives, two
magisterial documents are of primary importance: "Address to an
International Congress of Anesthesiologists," November 24, 1957, by Pope
Pius XII;12 "The Declaration on Euthanasia" by The Sacred Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith.13
A. Patient Self-Determination
Pius XII concisely formulates the fundamental consideration: "Natural
reason and Christian morals say that man (and whoever is entrusted with
the task of care of his fellowman) has the right and the duty in case of serious
illness to take the necessary treatment for the preservation of life and
health."14 The patient's duty to preserve his or her life and the right to the
means necessary provide the point of departure in any matter of patient
self-determination. This is so without prejudice to the corresponding rights
and duties of healthcare professionals, as Pope Pius indicated .
The Ethical and Religious Directivesfor Catholic Health Facilities, as
well as standard medical practice, recognize that the initiation,
continuation, or interruption of any medical procedure deemed permissible
requires "the consent, at least implied or reasonably presumed, of the
patient.or his guardians. "15 The need for consent recognizes that the patient
is director of the actions that will be undertaken in behalf of his or her life
and health. Nevertheless, "the right to refuse medical treatment is not an
independent right, but is a corollary to the patient's right and moral
responsibility to request reasonable treatment."16 In other words, the
private choice of the individual is not the only factor in the morality of the
situation. There are objective dimensions of all situations which contribute
to determining the morality of any choice which is to be made. Chief among
these objective elements, according to Catholic theology and medical
practice, is the duty to preserve life. This duty belongs both to the individual
and, in a different way, to the healthcare facility, as Pope Pius taught.
Insofar, then, as a healthcare facility is a moral agent, it must not blindly
follow the directives of another person, but must fulfill each of its duties
with conscious responsibility to its mission and to the moral teachings of the
Church. Compliance with the wishes of a given patient is thus limited by the
moral nature of the healthcare facility itself. Accordingly, our Catholic
policy is to respect and comply with all informed and conscientious requests
for, or refusals of, medical assistance, unless it involves some moral
irresponsibility for the facility, some failure in its duties to the well-being of
the patient.'7 Ultimately, responsibility for the moral uprightness of the
facility lies with the Administrator. That is, without normally being
personally involved in the patient-physician relationship, the Administrator
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sees that the policies and customary practices of the facility are formed
according to Catholic principles.
The conviction that the limits of our compliance are actually founded
upon the truth of human life, and therefore, that they are genuinely directed
toward the patient's best interests, gives us confidence to adhere to our
principles and to refuse to comply. This does not mean that we impose our
beliefs upon patients in violation of their decisions. Rather, we respect the
right and duty of the patient to self-determination. At the same time we
avoid complicity in activities contrary to our long moral tradition. And we
recognize that we also act rightly by not allowing the beliefs of another to be
imposed upon us.
B. End of Life Decisions
At the end oflife, a patient may exercise the right to self-determination in
more than one way. If the patient is competent, he or she retains the full
authority to direct the plan of treatment. If incompetent, one of many
possibilities may ensue. Advance directives are legal instruments, such as
living wills and durable powers of attorney for healthcare, which specify the
conditions under which they become operative. In the absence of an
operative legal document, decisions may be made by other interested
persons, usually families, friends or guardians, or at times by doctors, or
through court processes. 18
The limits of our willingness to comply with end of life decisions are
supplied by our understanding of euthanasia: "an action or an omission
which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in
this way be eliminated ."19 Thus, euthanasia "in all its forms is forbidden .
The failure to supply the ordinary means of preserving life is equivalent to
euthanasia. However, neither the physician nor the patient is obliged to the
use of extraordinary means."20 Because it is not always clear in a particular
case what constitutes euthanasia, the Church has presented an explicit and
authoritative statement.

C. The Declaration on Euthanasia
The Catholic theological tradition developed a doctrine concerning the
duty to preserve life by distinguishing between ordinary and extraordinary
means. Ordinary means are normally deemed obligatory, while extraordinary means normally involve some grave burden or disproportion
between themselves and the benefits they secure. Pius XII gave
authoritative expression to such a distinction 21 and The Sacred
Congregation for the Doctrine ofthe Faith developed, with slight linguistic
revision, our understanding of the distinction in the 1980 "Declaration on
Euthanasia. "
At the outset it is to be noted, as the "Declaration" teaches, that the
complexity of the situation may make it difficult to apply ethical principles.
It is necessary to advert both to the principles and to the peculiarity of an
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individual case. Accordingly, the judgment about the use of therapeutic
means belongs "to the conscience of the sick person, or of those qualified to
speak in the sick person's name, or of the doctors."22
The "Declaration" teaches:
Everyone has the duty to care for his or her own health or to seek such care from
others. Those whose task it is to care for the sick must do so conscientiously23 and
administer the remedies that seem necessary or useful.

The first consideration, as Pius XII also taught, is to preserve life 24 and
health. The first obligation, the presumption, if you will, is that everyone
care for his or her health . If a person is unable to fulfill this duty, he or she
still has the duty to seek such care from others. In the event of sickness,
others have the duty to care for the sick person and to administer necessary
or useful remedies . The existence of each of these duties is not something
which needs to be proven. These evident duties are the foundation of the
discussion.
With this established, the Congregation considers whether it is
"necessary in all circumstances to have recourse to all possible remedies." In
brief, the reply is that there is no obligation to use extraordina ry or
disproportionately burdensome means. To clarify the meaning of these
terms, the "Declaration" teaches:
In any case, it will be possible to make a correct judgment as to the means by
studying the type of treatment to be used , its degree of complexity or risk, its cost
and the possibilities of using it , and comparing these elements with the result that
can be expected, taking into account the state of the sick person and his or her
physical and moral resources .

Thus, in a particular case, those means are deemed non-obligatory whose
expected results for this given patient are disproportionate to the type of
treatment, or to the degree of complexity or risk, or to the cost, or to the
availability of the means in question.
It must not be overlooked that the Congregation begins with the certain
duty to preserve life and health and then shows how to recognize means
which are exceptional in the fulfillment of the duty. In other words, in the
ourfirst response is that the duty to preserve life or health is
event of illness,
J
to be fulfilled by means which are necessary or useful. If the use of those
means is seen to be disproportionately burdensome according to the terms
ofthe "Declaration", they need not be employed or may be interrupted. Let
there be no mistake: if a means is necessary or useful for the preservation of
life or health, the obligation to use it exists unless it is shown to be
disproportionately burdensome in the particular situation. 25
According to the teaching of the "Declaration", the obligation to use the
means which are necessary or useful is more fundamental than the option
not to use them. For the obligation to use life-preserving means depends
upon the certain duty to preserve life and health. On the other hand, the
option not to use the means depends upon their being shown to impose
burdens disproportionate to their benefits. Therefore, when it is not
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immediately clear whether the use of therapeutic means is disproportionately burdensome, it is not an entirely open question whether or not
such means are to be employed. The presumption is that the necessary or
useful means are to be employed unless there is evidence that the means are
optional, according to the terms of the "Declaration".
The "Declaration" offers some clarifications to facilitate the application
of these general principles:
Ifthere are not other sufficient remedies, it is permitted, with the patient's consent,
to have recourse to the means provided by the most advanced medical techniques,
even if these means are still at the experimental stage and are not without a certain
risk . . .
It is also permitted, with the patient's consent, to interrupt these means, where the
results fall short of expectations . ..
It is also permissible to make do with the normal means that medicine can offer.
Therefore one cannot impose on anyone the obligation to have recourse to a
technique which is already in use but which carries a risk or is burdensome.2 6

The first two clarifications share the common presupposition of a case
where "the normal means that medicine can offer" are not "sufficient."
These clarifications state that in such a case, it is permitted to employ
advanced medical techniques and it is permitted to interrupt them if the
results are less than expected . The third clarification states that it is always27
permitted not to have recourse to the advanced means at all.
The "Declaration" adds a separate clarification for specific circumstances:
When inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means used , it is 'permitted in
conscience to take the decision to refuse forms oftreatment that would only secure
a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so long as the normal care due
to the sick person in similar cases is not interrupted.

It must be emphasized that this "decision to refuse" depends upon the
imminence of death "in spite of the means used."28 The "Declaration"
teaches that we do not determine that death is imminent by considering the
state of the person independent of the use of the means. That is, if the means
are effective to preserve life, death is not imminent. No one should apply the
terms of this qualification to a case where death is not imminent in spite of
the means used.
Also it should be noted that the phrase "burdensome prolongation of
life" recalls an earlier passage in the "Declaration":
Ultimately, the word euthanasia is used in a more particular sense to mean 'mercy
killing', for the purpose of putting an end to extreme suffering, or saving abnormal
babies, the mentally ill or the incurably sick from the prolongation, perhaps for
many years, of a miserable life , which could impose too heavy a burden on their
families or on society.

The contrast between the parallel phrases (prolongation of a miserable life
vs . burdensome prolongation of life )29 points to a subtle distinction which
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is precisely the heart of the matter. It is euthanasia to intend to bring an end
(through action or omission) to human life which is burdensome or
miserable. It is not euthanasia to bring an end to a burdensome means of
prolonging life.
Finally, it should be restated that, in those cases where death is not
imminent and the means which are available for use are effective in the
conservation of life, there can be tremendous difficulty in determining in the
particular case what means one is strictly required to use as opposed to
those means one is permitted either to use or to refuse. It is not possible to
identify a given technical means and to classify it as always and in all
circumstances obligatory. The final decision is contingent upon the
circumstances of the individ ual cases and rests with the consciences of the
patient or those who act in the patient's behalf.'30
IV. Application of the "Declaration on Euthanasia"
for Administrators of Catholic Healthcare Facilities
Applying the principles formulated in the "Declaration on Euthanasia"
to end of life decisions is not easy. The principles have been stated by the
Church to help individuals and institutions arrive at a correct formation of
conscience. Still, it is difficult to see clearly all aspects of the question. No
one should underestimate the intricacy and the peculiarity of individual
cases. Allow me, then, to summarize the essential points relative to the
"Declaration" for Administrators of healthcare facilities making policies
and decisions concerning the implementation of end of life directives.
1. It is the function of the Administrator to ensure that the practices of
the healthcare facility follow the guidelines of the" Declaration." Normally,
this is done at the level of policy. In rare cases, the Administrator, with the
counsel oft rusted personnel, may be required to determine whether a given
advance directive or other medical order here and now conflicts with stated
policy or with Catholic teaching. Normally we can comply, but in the case
of an evident violation, the Administrator refuses compliance. The
Administrator may thus determine that an individual's request or directive
is not in harmony with Catholic teaching, or that the individual has
misunderstood or misapplied the principles. To make this judgment is not
to accuse any person of wrongdoing or sin. 3) It is, rather, to point out an
error of judgment and to refuse to involve the facility in an activity which
violates the moral responsibility of the facility.
2. Perhaps the most troubling end of life decisions concern the refusal or
removal of artificial nutrition and hydration. On the one hand, it is difficult
to assert an obligation that a person live in a debilitated state for what may
be a long time. On the other hand, it is unsettling to assert that a person may
die of starvation under medical supervision. This issue does not admit of
easy resolution, as evidenced by the ongoing medical, ethical, theological
and legal debates. The fact that the "Declaration on Euthanasia" did not
address this issue in particular does not mean that the general principles it
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articulated do not apply to questions of artificial nutrition and hydration.
On the contrary, in the absence of a specific treatment of this issue, it is
imperative to understand how the general principles articulated in the
"Declaration" apply to this question.
It should be noted that it is essentially irrelevant whether artificial
nutrition and hydration are to be considered parts of normal care or forms
of medical treatment. All means of preserving life or health, whether
normal care or medical therapy, are subject to the analysis described in the
"Declaration on Euthanasia." The moral obligation to use a given means
does not arise exclusively from the nature of the means, for one must also
consider the circumstances of the case. That is, even aspects of normal care,
under extreme circumstances, may be extraordinary or disproportionate in
a particular situation. It is not true morally to say that artificial nutrition
and hydration must be applied under any and all circumstances. The moral
assessment of the case does not take away from, but rather depends upon,
the physician's expertise. Only in light of the circumstances of the particular
case does it become possible to determine what is necessary or useful and
what is disproportionate.
Food and water are always necessary, but a given means of artificial
nutrition and hydration may not be necessary because other, more normal
means for the provision of nutrients are sufficient. Food and water are
always useful for a living being. Still, a given means of artificial nutrition
and hydration may not be useful in cases where the body is chronically
incapable of assimilating the nutrients 32 which are provided in this manner.
In such cases, when artificial means fail to deliver nutrients in a manner in
which they may be assimilated, artificial nutrition and hydration are,
properly speaking, useless. Artificial nutrition and hydration are not useless
in cases where they effectively deliver nutrients but fail to bring about some
other, indirect benefit, such as the restoration of consciousness. Artificial
nutrition and hydration are useful for the provision of nutrients and useless
when they fail to provide nutrients; they are not useless when they fail to
secure complete recovery from some symptom, pathology, or condition
extrinsic to the need for nutrients.
3. The use of therapeutic means is optional, according to the
"Declaration," when their use imposes burdens which are disproportionate
to the benefits their use secures. It is essential to note that the proportion in
question lies between the burdens the means introduce when used and the
benefits the means achieve. When resorting to medical means, we are
responsible for the burdens which our intervention imposes. If those
burdens are excessive in relation to the achievements of the intervention, the
medical means may be refused or discontinued. However, the use of means
is not deemed disproportionate due to the presence of burdens or misery
which arise independent of the medical intervention in question. 33
Additionally, in cases where death is imminent in spite ofthe means used,
one need not apply the same standards. For the "Declaration" teaches that
under the conditions of imminent death in spite of medical intervention it
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is not necessary to employ means which secure only a burdensome
prolongation of life.
4. The "Declaration" teaches: "Those whose task it is to care for the sick
must do so conscientiously and administer the remedies that seem necessary
or useful." Catholic healthcare facilities, then , as professional medical
providers, cannot avoid the duty to provide life-preserving means,
including artificial nutrition and hydration,34 to those for whom they are
necessary or useful, unless their provision imposes burdens disproportionate to its benefits , according to the terms of the 'Declaration'." That is,
in cases where artificial nutrition and hydration are necessary or useful,
Catholic health care facilities must apply such means in the fulfillment of
their duties as described in and subject to the limitations specified in the
"Declaration on Euthanasia." Limits to the fulfillment ofthe certain duty to
preserve life arise when the use of the means is disproportionately
burdensome in the situation or when death is imminent in spite of the means
used.
V. Conclusion

This analysis should throw light on the moral dimensions of your
implementation of advance directives. I present this letter to assist you in
understanding Catholic moral teaching and to enable you to reject certain
misunderstandings of that teaching. It should. not represent a departure
from your customary practices, but should provide the intellectual and
Catholic grounds for practices which respect and defend the sanctity of
human life, despite the miseries and sufferings to which it is susceptible.
I offer this direction in order that you might maintain your catholicity in
the face of a legal and social environment which embraces other principles.
The Catholic Church has consistently exhibited a moral tradition
independent of the legal and social circumstances within which it lives.
Today, the federal government provides for us an occasion to exercise
moral leadership through articulating our principles upholding the sanctity
of human life in contrast to the political and legal structures which, at times ,
would permit its neglect. Since the courts have not dealt finally with these
questions, visible adherence to our principles has no small influence , for we
draw upon a tradition older and a teaching more profound than the law.
Catholic moral leadership in the field of healthcare is essential to defend and
promote the non-sectarian truth of human life.
Given at my Chancery September 14, 1991 , the Feast of the Triumph of
the Cross.
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29. This connection is obvious in the English and Italian ('i1 pro/ungar'si di una vita
infelice"; "pro/ungamento precario e penoso della vita") versions of the text. The Latin
version supports the parallel, although the terms used are not the same: "infelicis vitae
prorogatio"; "precariam et d%ris p/enam vitae di/ationem").
30. In this context, let it be stated once more that the moral standing of the healthcare
facility is not determined entirely by the wishes of the patient. After the patient has reached a
decision concerning the course of treatment, the healthcare facility remains bound to assess
the moral implications of its own cooperation in the decisions of the patient.
31. The complexities which make this issue difficult to understand may also contribute to
reducing or removing altogether any culpability, should an individual commit an error of
judgment.
32. Nutrition and hydration are here treated as if there were no difference in their
provision. This is an editorial convenience. It must be recognized that it may be the case
medically that the provision of caloric nutrients may create complications which the
provision of water does not. At such times, their provision should be regarded as separate
life-preserving means.
33. It may be helpful to consider the distinction between keeping alive someone who is
unconscious and keeping unconscious someone who is alive. The former may be achieved
through artificial nutrition and hydration, for example, while the latter is achieved through
any means which imposes unconsciousness.
34. This classifies the means of artificial nutrition and hydration among "the normal
means that medicine can offer" as opposed to "the most advanced techniques," in the terms
of the "Declaration." Means of artificial nutrition and hydration which normally can be
maintained through skilled nursing are certainly among "the normal means that medicine·
can offer," given the state of care which can be expected from a professional healthcare
facility.
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